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Abstract
Whether the free movement of goods provisions in EU law apply to the acts of private parties
has long been the subject of discussion in the literature, although for many years the discussion
was rather inactive. However, because of developments in the case-law of the European Court of
Justice on the other freedoms, the question of the extent to which actions of private parties are
caught has become of particular interest. This Article addresses this debate and seeks to offer
some guidance towards its resolution.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether the free movement of goods provisions in EU law1
apply to the acts of private parties has long been the subject of
*
B.A. 1975, M.A. 1979, Oxford University; M.Sc. 1976 London University (LSE);
Barrister (Middle Temple, 1978), LL.D., Utrecht University (1985); FRSA; Professor of
European Law & Jean Monnet Professor, University of Groningen (The Netherlands), Jean
Monnet Centre of Excellence; Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium). President
of the European Law Faculties Association 2015–2016.
1. The major primary sources of EU law are to be found in the Treaty on European
Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), and in
the Euratom Treaty. See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union
2012 O.J. C 326/13, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. The relevant provisions for this discussion are
Articles 30–36 TFEU, which deal with the prohibitions of quantititative restrictions on imports
and exports and measures having equivalent effect, and the principal Treaty-based grounds of
justification for such measures. See the present Author’s earlier contributions in this area in
this Journal: Laurence W. Gormley, Two Years after Keck 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 866 (1996);
Laurence W. Gormley, Silver Threads Among the Gold . . . 50 Years of the Free Movement of
Goods, 31 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 1637 (2008); Laurence W. Gormley, Free Movement of
Goods and their Use – What is the Use of it?, 33 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 1589 (2010). A brief
note on new citation is appropriate. Citations for ECJ cases are given to the European Court
Reports (“ECR”) where this is available, as well as to the new ECSI. Since January 1, 2012 the
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discussion in the literature,2 although for many years the discussion
was rather inactive. However, because of developments in the caselaw of the European Court of Justice on the other freedoms,3 the
question of the extent to which actions of private parties are caught
has become of particular interest. This Article addresses this debate
and seeks to offer some guidance towards its resolution.
The free movement of goods provisions have traditionally been
seen as not usually applying to acts of private individuals—thus your
blinkered uncle who thinks that all things foreign are nasty is
perfectly free to decide not to buy French wine because he finds garlic
and philosophy corrupting influences on the minds of young people,
no matter how misguided that view undoubtedly is. The well-known
department stores, Harrods, in London, and KaDeWe in Berlin are
free to promote British or German products respectively if they wish.4
printed versions of the ECR. are no longer produced. Judgments both before and after that date
may be found using the search form on the ECJ’s website http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
recherche.jsf?language=en or through the Euro-Lex website http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
homepage.html?locale=en. The ECLI reference has nothing to do with the ECJ’s case number
but is the European Case Law Identifier, see further, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
European_Case_Law_Identifier; it is only mentioned here the first time a judgment is cited..
2. E.g., W. van Gerven, The recent case law of the Court of Justice concerning Articles
30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5, 22–23 (1977); P. VerLoren van
Themaat & L.W. Gormley, Prohibiting Restriction of Free Trade within the Community:
Articles 30–36 of the EEC Treaty, 3 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 577 (1981); L.W. GORMLEY,
PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC 259–62 (North Holland, 1985); N.
MacGowan & M. Quinn, Could Article 30 Impose Obligations on Individuals?, 12 EURO. L.
REV. 163 (1987); J. Banquero Cruz, Free Movement and Private Autonomy, 18 EURO. L.REV.
603 (1999); J. Snell, Private Parties and the Free Movement of Goods and Services, in
SERVICES AND FREE MOVEMENT 211–43 (M. Andenas & W.-H. Roth eds., Oxford University
Press, 2002); S. van den Bogaert, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET
UNPACKING THE PREMISES 123–52 (C. Barnard & J. Scott eds., Hart, 2002); W.-H. Roth,
Privatautonomie und die Grundfreiheiten des EG-Vertrags, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR DIETER
MEDICUS (V. Beuthien et al. eds., 2009) 303; E.J. Lohse, Fundamental Freedoms and Private
Actors – Towards an “Indirect Horizontal Effect”, 13 EUR. PUBL. L. 159 (2007); M. Jarvis, in
OLIVER ON FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 67–78 (P. Oliver ed., 5th
ed. 2010) (with references to further literature, see id. at 67); H. Schepel, Constitutionalising
the Market, Marketing the Constitution, and to Tell the Difference: On the Horizontal
Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law, 18 EURO. L. J. 177 (2012); L.J.
Ankersmit, GLOBALISATION AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 217–43 (Diss., Free University of
Amsterdam, 2015).
3. The other freedoms are the free movement of workers (arts. 45–48 TFEU); the
freedom of establishment (arts. 49–55 TFEU); the free movement of services (arts. 56–62
TFEU), and the free movement of capital and payments (arts. 63–66 TFEU).
4. In Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 207/83 [1985] E.C.R. 1201, 1212,
ECLI:EU:C:1985:161 the Court observed (at ¶ 21) that “if the national origin of goods brings
certain qualities to the minds of consumers, it is in manufacturers’ interests to indicate it
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But the public sector may not.5 The traditional view has been that the
only circumstances in which what are now Articles 34–36 TFEU
could affect the actions of a private party are in relation to attempts to
use industrial and commercial property rights under national
legislation to prevent parallel imports from other Member States: thus
an injunction granted by a national court to restrain imports would fall
foul of EU law if it restrained the parallel importation of goods
lawfully placed on the market in another Member State by the right
owner or with his, her, or its consent.6 The Court of Justice also made
it clear in the intellectual property context that agreements between
private individuals cannot not derogate from the free movement of
goods.7 In line with this approach, but in the context of charges
having equivalent effect to customs duties, the Court has held that the
prohibition of such charges extended to catch a transit charge
designed to compensate a private undertaking for bearing costs
arising from the performance by the customs and veterinary services
of their tasks as providers of services in the public interest even if the
charge had not been imposed by the State but arose from an
agreement concluded by the undertaking concerned with its
customers.8

themselves on the goods or on their packaging and it is not necessary to compel them to do
so.”
5. See, e.g., Commission v. Ireland, Case 249/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4005,
ECLI:EU:C:1982:402; see also L.W. GORMLEY, EU LAW OF FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS
AND CUSTOMS UNION 420–23 (2009); S. Enchelmaier, in OLIVER ON FREE MOVEMENT OF
GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 2, at 168–69.
6. Industrie Diensten Groep BV v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij BV, Case 6/81 [1982]
E.C.R. 707, 716–17 (¶ 7–9), ECLI:EU:C:1982:72.
7. Dansk Supermarked A/S v. A/S Imerco, Case 58/80, [1981] E.C.R. 181, 195 (¶ 17),
ECLI:EU:C:1981:17. The Court was referring to the fact that a clause in such an agreement
which purported to restrict exports or imports would be unenforceable, as an injunction in
restraint of importation or exportation (or the award of damages in lieu) is a measure having
equivalent effect. See Beele, supra note 6, at 716, ¶ 7. Any justification for such a measure
would have to be decided on the facts, rather than be pre-empted by the agreement.
8. Édouard Dubois et Fils SA et al. v. Garonor Exploitation SA, Case C-16/94, [1995]
E.C.R. I-2421, 2438. (¶ 20–21) ECLI:EU:C:1995:268. The charge, irrespective of by whom it
was imposed, arose directly or indirectly from the failure of the Member State concerned to
fulfil its financial obligations in relation to controls and formalities carried out in connection
with the cross-border movement of goods from other Member States.
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I. EARLY DISCUSSIONS
There was always some discussion of this question in the
literature on the European continent in various languages.9 VerLoren
van Themaat and the present Author discussed the question at some
length in an article in 1981,10 looking at whether what are now
Articles 34–36 TFEU could impose duties as well as confer rights on
individuals. We considered three examples:
(1) a collective boycott of imports by employees seeking to resist
any threat to their jobs posed by imports;
(2) a collective refusal by employees, acting in sympathy with
colleagues striking in another Member State, to handle products
destined for export, and finally,
(3) private behavioural standards for industrial products.

We argued that the wording of what is now Articles 34—36
TFEU did not itself exclude their application to these types of actions,
and considered an analogy with the judgments of the Court in
Walrave & Koch11 (which made it plain that rules of sporting
governing bodies, in so far as they covered professional sport, have to
comply with the free movement of workers and the freedom to
provide services) and in Defrenne v. SABENA12 (which showed that
prohibition on discrimination between men and women applied not
only to the action of public authorities, but also extended to all
agreements which were intended to regulate paid labor collectively, as
well as to contracts between individuals).
That great jurist, Walter van Gerven, argued in 1977 in part on
the basis of the judgment in Walrave & Koch13 and the judgments in
Sterling Drug14 and DGG v. Metro,15 and in part on the basis of
Defrenne v. SABENA16 that the Court had indeed adopted this
9. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. van Themaat & Gormley, supra note 2, at 607–09.
11. Walrave & Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale et al, Case 36/74
[1974] E.C.R. 1405, 1418–19 (¶ 16 et seq.), ECLI:EU:C:1974:140; see Donà v. Mantero, Case
13/76 [1976] E.C.R. 1333, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115.
12. Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne SABENA, Case 45/75
[1976] E.C.R. 455, 476 (¶ 39), ECLI:EU:C:1976:56
13. Walrave & Koch, supra note 11, at 1418–19 (¶ 15 & 25).
14. Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., Case 15/74 [1974] E.C.R. 1147 at 1163 (¶ 15),
ECLI:EU:C:1974:114.
15. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG,
Case 78/70 [1971] E.C.R. 487, 500 (see in particular ¶ 12–13) ECLI:EU:C:1971:59.
16. Defrenne v. Sabena, supra note 12, ¶ 39.
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analogy.17 VerLoren van Themaat and the present writer submitted
that the question at that time remained open, but that the extension of
the prohibition of quantitative restrictions to measures having
equivalent effect meant that any attempted evasion of the free
movement principle by collective action should fall within the
prohibition.18 At the same time, they recalled that the case-law-based
justifications stemming from Dassonville itself would permit certain
reasonable hindrances to imports or exports for non-economic
purposes.19
II. BUY-NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS AND STATE RESOURCES
By 1985, it began to become clear that the trend of the case-law
was going against private parties being caught. Cases such as
Commission v. Ireland20 (the Buy-Irish case) and Apple & Pear
Development Council v. Lewis21 demonstrated that private parties had
far more freedom of action than State-managed and State-financed
bodies. In Buy-Irish the Court emphasised that a buy-national
campaign which was State-initiated, managed by State appointees,
largely State-funded, and the aims and broad outline of which were
defined by the government, even though through the form of a private
company, could not be considered in the same way as a campaign by
an undertakings or group of undertakings—whether public or
private—to promote their products.22 In Apple & Pear Development
Council v. Lewis the Court expressly stated that:
a body such as the Development Council, which is set up by the
government of a Member State and is financed by a charge
imposed on growers cannot under Community law enjoy the
same freedom as regards the methods of advertising used as that

17. W. van Gerven, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5, 22–23 (1977).
18. See van Themaat & Gormley, supra note 2, at 608–09.
19. See id. at 609.
20. Commission v. Ireland Case 249/81 [1982] E.C.R. 4005, ECLI:EU:C:1982:402.
21. Apple & Pear Development Council v. K.J. Lewis Ltd. et al., Case 222/82 [1983]
E.C.R. 4083, ECLI:EU:C:1983:370.
22. Commission v. Ireland, supra note 20, at 4022 (¶ 23). The Guaranteed Irish
campaign (which still exists) was later separated from the Irish Goods Council and carried on
without State funding or State appointments. It was launched by the then President of Ireland
in 1984. That does not, however, amount to State involvement, nor would it be enough to
attribute the actions of the Guaranteed Irish campaign to the State.
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enjoyed by producers themselves or producers’ associations of a
voluntary character.23

The Court did not actually rule on what freedom was actually enjoyed
by private parties, but simply confined itself to the restrictions placed
on public sector involvement.
The objections to the application of Articles 34–36 TFEU to
actions of private parties were based in part on the observation that
the judgments in Walrave & Koch and Defrenne had rather more to
do with discrimination than with free movement as such, and in part
on the possibility that collective action might amount to a concerted
practice within the context of competition law.24 But they were also
based on the reductio ad absurdam argument that a person who
decided to buy, say, a British product should not feel that she or he
ran the risk of being sued by an importer of a rival product.25 The
TFEU leaves the exercise of consumer choice entirely in the hands of
the consumer, so that both consumer and trader are in principle free to
buy and sell respectively throughout the single market which the
Treaty establishes. Perhaps strangely in view of the Court’s approach
in the Buy-Irish case, MacGowan and Quinn pleaded that what is now
Article 34 TFEU should only impose obligations on private parties if
there was a legal relationship between the private parties, and the
measures of the party intended to be bound by Article 34 were legally
binding acts, and such measures were taken in pursuance of an
economic activity.26 In Buy-Irish, the Court had of course rejected the
contention that only legally binding State measures were caught.27
23. Apple & Pear Development Council, supra note 21, at 4119 (¶ 17). The Court went
on to state (id. ¶18–19) that such a body was:
under a duty not to engage in any advertising intended to discourage the purchase of
products of other Member States or to disparage those products in the eyes of
consumers. Nor must it advise consumers to purchase domestic products solely by
reason of their national origin. On the other hand, Article [34 TFEU] does not
prevent such a body from drawing attention, in its publicity, to the specific qualities
of fruit grown in the Member State in question or from organising campaigns to
promote the sale of certain varieties, mentioning their particular properties, even if
those varieties are typical of national production.
See, in to a quality label for German produce, Commission v. Germany, Case C-325/00 [2002]
E.C.R. I-9997, ECLI:EU:C:2002:633. See also the European Commission’s Community
Guidelines: Aid for advertising of certain products, O.J. C 252/5 (2001) ¶ 1, 4–8, 19–24, 35–
50.
24. See GORMLEY, supra note 2, at 261.
25. Id. at 262.
26. See MacGowan & Quinn, supra note 2, at 177–78.
27. See Commission v. Ireland, supra note 20, at 4023 (¶ 28–29).
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The case-law against Articles 34–36 TFEU imposing obligations
on private parties started to grow in other areas. In holding that
Articles 34 and 35 TFEU only concerned public measures and not the
conduct of undertakings, judgments such as those in Vlaamse
reisbureaus28 and Bayer v. Süllhöfer29 make it plain that there is a
clear separation in function between the free movement provisions
and the competition provisions of the Treaty.30 The judgment in
Sapod Audic demonstrates that contractual terms agreed between
private parties will not fall foul of Articles 34–36 TFEU.31 This latter
case can be distinguished from the approach in Dansk Supermarked
which really related to the use of intellectual property rights
emanating from national legislation, thus the use of possibilities made
available by State measures.32 It was the State measures activated at
the instance of a private party (through an injunction) which would
actually cause the barrier to trade.33
Yet the view that private parties are not bound by Articles 34–36
TFEU does not mean that their conduct is unaffected by those
provisions.34 If the State shelters behind a private body, Buy Irish, and
Commission v. Germany35 on the CMA quality label, demonstrate that
such a construction will offer no protection against Articles 34–36.36
Similarly, Commission v. United Kingdom on origin marking
28. VZW Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. VZW Sociale Dienst van de
Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten, Case 311/85 [1987] E.C.R. 3801, 3830 (¶ 30),
ECLI:EU:C:1987:418.
29. Bayer AG et al. v. Süllhöfer, Case 65/86 [1988] E.C.R. 5249, 5285 (¶ 11–12),
ECLI:EU:C:1988:448. This case concerned a no-challenge clause in a patent licensing
agreement: the Court found that this did not involve the application of a national intellectual
property right likely to be a barrier to the free movement of goods between Member States, but
the validity of an agreement between undertakings which could have as its object or effect the
restriction or distortion of competition, thus the question fell to be decided under what is now
Article 101 TFEU.
30. This also followed from the judgment in Officier van Justitie v. van de Haar et al,
Joined Cases 177 & 178/82 [1984] E.C.R. 1797, 1812–13 (¶ 11–13) ECLI:EU:C:1984:144.
31. Sapod Audic v. Eco-Emballanges SA, Case C-159/00 [2002] E.C.R. I-5031, 5085 (¶
74), ECLI:EU:C:2002:343.
32. See Dansk Supermarket, supra note 7.
33. See Beele, supra note 6; Pharmon v. Hoechst, Case 19/84 [1985] E.C.R. 2281, 2297
(¶ 22) ECLI:EU:C:1985:304.
34. See GORMLEY, supra note 2, at 262. This is well-demonstrated by the intellectual
property cases discussed in the text above.
35. Commission v. Germany, supra, note 23, at 10000–02 (¶ 17–21).
36. See Hennen Olie BV v. Stichting Interim Centraal Orgaan Voorraadvorming
Aardolieproducten & State of the Netherlands, Case 302/88 [1990] E.C.R. I-4639, 4643 (¶ 14–
15), ECLI:EU:C:1990:455.
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demonstrates that the Court will look behind the face of measures to
see exactly what is going on and expose bogus justifications for what
they are.37 The tacit delegation and transfer of a financial burden by
the State to a private undertaking is also caught by the free movement
of goods provisions.38 Disciplinary measures (in this case aimed at
penalising the prescription of parallel imports) adopted by a body
established by Royal Charter, which has a committee that exercises
statutory disciplinary powers over the members of the body, may also
constitute measures having equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions.39
Where the State (in any manifestation) can be demonstrated to
have ‘grandfathered’40 national standards, such as Deustche Industrie
Normen (“DIN”) norms or British Standards by making compliance
with them obligatory in the award of public contracts, there will be a
breach of Articles 34–36 TFEU, and now also of the relevant
procurement directive if it applies; the lessons of Dundalk41 have been
learned.
But it is not only in relation to procurement that standardisation
and certification is relevant. In Fra.Bo42 the Court considered the
activities of a private-law standardisation and cerrtification body
(“DVGW”), addressing the question whether that body had to comply
with the provisions of primary EU law on the free movement of goods
in drawing up specifications and in certifying products. In a
remarkably short, yet quietly powerful judgment, the Court noted that
the fact that an importer might be dissuaded from introducing or
marketing a particular product in a Member State constituted a
restriction on the free movement of goods for the importer.43 It also
37. See generally Commission. v. U.K., Case 207/83 [1985] E.C.R. 1201.
38. See Dubiois, supra note 8.
39. R. v. Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, ex parte Association of
Pharmaceutical Importers, Joined Cases 266 & 267/87 [1989] E.C.R. 1295,
ECLI:EU:C:1989:205.
40. The term “grandfathering” comes from the United States. See Guinn & Beal v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
41. Commission v. Ireland, Case 45/87 [1988] E.C.R. 4929, ECLI:EU:C:1988:435. As to
the procurement directives, see European Parliament & Council Directive 2004/18, O.J. L
134/114 (2004), art. 23; European Parliament & Council Directive 2014/24, O.J. L 94/65
(2014), art. 42.
42. Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) –
Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Verein, Case C-171/11 (July 12, 2012), ECLI:EU:C:2012:453.
43. Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-286/07 [2008] E.C.R. I-63* (transcript in
French
only),
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?

2015] PRIVATE PARTIES & FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 1001
noted that it had condemned measures whereby a Member State,
without lawful justification, encouraged economic operators wishing
to market in its territory construction products, lawfully manufactured
and/or marketed in another Member State, to obtain national marks of
conformity44 when it refused to recognise the equivalence of approval
certificates issued by another Member State.45 It was common ground
that DVGW was a non-profit, private-law body whose activities were
not financed by the German State, nor did the latter have any decisive
influence over the standardisation and certification activities, even
though some of DVGW’s members were public bodies.
The Court observed that the relevant national law provided that
products certified were compliant with national legislation and that it
was undisputed that DVGW was the only body able to certify the
copper fittings at issue in the main proceedings for the purposes of the
German legislation. The referring national court had stated that in
practice the lack of such certification placed a considerable restriction
on the marketing of the products concerned on the German market.
Although the German law merely laid down the general sales
conditions as between water supply undertakings and their customers,
from which the parties were free to depart, it was apparent that, in
practice, almost all German consumers purchased copper fittings
certified by DVGW, so that access to the German market for nonDVGW-certified copper fittings was well nigh impossible.46 In these
circumstances, it was clear that DVGW, by virtue of its authority to
certify the products, in reality held the power to regulate the entry into
the German market for, in this case, copper fittings. It followed,
therefore, as night follows day, that in the circumstances the Court
found the ambit of what is now Article 34 TFEU extended to
DVGW’s standardization and certification activities.47

text=&docid=72070&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=588386 (see ¶ 27)), ECLI:EU:C:2008:251.
44. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-227/06 [2008] E.C.R. I-46*, (¶ 34) (transcript in
French only), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
70344&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=586149 (see ¶
27).
45. Commission v. Portugal, Case C-432/03 [2005] E.C.R. I-9665, 9698–9701 (¶ 41, 49,
52).
46. Technically there was another route, but it was so cumbersome that in reality it was
impractical.
47. The Court did not discuss any possible justifications, although Advocate General
Trstenjak briefly did so. See ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, ¶ 54 et seq.
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Although DVGW was not acting as the formal agent of the State,
it certainly acted as a body to whom power had been effectively
devolved or whose activities were legislatively blessed. In the
circumstances, the conclusion that its activities had to conform to the
free movement of goods provisions of the Treaty is wholly logical:
functionally it had become an extension or instrument of the State.
There is, however, nothing in the judgment which actually suggests
that in other circumstances standardization and certification activities
would be caught. In effect the German approach was acutally very
similar to that taken at EU level in the ‘New Approach’
harmonisation instruments.48 Products certified as conforming to the
relevant standard are deemed to comply with the essential health and
safety criteria demanded by the European legislation. The fact that
almost all German consumers purchased copper fittings certified by
DVGW was not on its own a reason for finding that the activities of
DVGW were caught, rather it is evidence of the impact on market
access which the certificaton requirement had.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OTHER FREEDOMS
For many years it has been clear that at least as far as private
collective measures are concerned, the freedom of movement
48. As to which, see A Mattera, L’ Arrêt, ‘Cassis de Dijon’: Une nouvelle approche
pour la réalisation et le bon fonctionnement du marché intérieur’, RMC 505 (1980); L.W.
Gormley, Cassis de Dijon and the Communication from the Commission, 6 EUR. L. REV. 454
(1981); J. McMillan, Qu’est-ce que la normalisation? Normes et règles et techniques et libre
circulation des produits dans la Communauté, RMC 93 (1985); R.H. Lauwaars, The ‘Model
Directive’ on Technical Harmonization, in 1992: ONE EUROPEAN MARKET? 151 (R. Bieber et
al. eds., Nomos, 1988); L.W. Gormley, Some Reflections on the Internal Market and Free
Movement of Goods, LIEI 9,10-13 (1989/1); J. McMillan, La "certification", la
reconnaissance mutuelle et le marché unique, RMUE 181 (1991); F. Aubry-Caillaud, Nouvelle
approche et normalisation européenne en matière de libre circulation des marchandises, in LA
LIBRE CIRCULATION DES MARCHANDISES NOUVELLE APPROCHE ET NORMALISATION
EUROPEENNE (Pedone. 1998); J. McMillan, La politique réglementaire communautaire pour
la libre circulation des marchandises et l’approfondissement/achèvement du marché intérieur,
RDUE 229 (2010). Copper fittings were ‘construction products’ in respect of which no
harmonized standard, European technical approval or national standard recognized at EU level
within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Construction Products Directive (Directive 89/106
(O.J. L 40/12 (1989) as amended by Reg. 1882/2003 (O.J. L 284/1) (2003)). Directive 89/106
has now been repealed by Regulation 305/2011 (O.J. L 88/5 (2011)). Accordingly, by virtue of
Article 6(2) of the directive, Member States were obliged to allow such products to be placed
on the market in their territory if they satisfy national provisions consistent with the Treaty
until European technical specifications provided otherwise. The case fell thus to be decided
solely under the free movement of goods provisions, without further regard to the directive,
Commission v. Belgium, supra note 44 (¶ 69).
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concerning workers, establishment, and the provision of services have
to be complied with.49 In Angonese the Court made it plain that this
applies equally to individual measures taken by private sector
employers.50 This development is perfectly rational and was to an
extent foreseen in relation to the free movement of workers in
Articles 7–9 of the old Regulation 1612/6851 (see now Articles 7–9 of
Regulation 492/2011).52 In more recent years the emphasis in the free
movement of workers, the right of establishment, and the freedom to
provide services has moved away from merely being concerned with
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. Thus measures which
preclude or deter nationals of a Member State from leaving their
country of origin in order to exercise their right to freedom of
movement are an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without
regard to the nationality of the person concerned.53 The importance of
this development cannot be overestimated. With this broad approach
the Court brought a principle crafted in the often highly technical
context of social security cases clearly into mainstream free
movement case-law. In condemning measures which prohibit, impede
or render less attractive the exercise of the free movement of workers,
establishment and services54 the Court confirmed that these freedoms

49. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
50. Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98 [2000] E.C.R. I4139, 4173 (¶ 36), ECLI:EU:C:2000:296. This is in line with the approach that private
employers cannot resurrect barriers to free movement that the Member States have been
obliged to abolish: equal treatment is thus central to the freedoms (although they are not
limited to equal treatment requirements).
51. O.J. English Special Edition Series I, 1968 (II) 475.
52. O.J. L 141/1 (2009). These provisions deal with equal treatment of migrant workers
from other Member States: disciminatory provisions in collective or individual agreements are
void (art. 7(4)); the possibility of participating in trade union activities is ensured (art. 8); and
equal access to housing is guaranteed (art. 9). The use of a regulation (as opposed to a
directive) for these rights ensured that the rights would be directly applicable and enforceable
both vertically (against the public authorities) and horizontally (against private employers).
53. Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. Bosman et al., Case
C-415/93 [1995] E.C.R. I-4921, 5069 (¶ 96), ECLI:EU:C:1995:463; see Deliège v. Ligue
francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL et al., Joined Cases C-51/96 & 191/97
[2000] E.C.R. I-2549, ECLI:EU:C:2000:199; Lehtonen et al. v.. Fédération royal belge des
sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB), Case C-176/96 [2000] E.C.R. I-2681,
ECLI:EU:C:2000:201. In Bosman, the Court cited its earlier judgment in Maggio v.
Bundesknappschaft, Case C-10/90 [1991] E.C.R. I-1119, 1139–40 (¶ 18–19) in relation to
social security benefits. That latter judgment invoked case-law stretching back to 1975 in
support of the widest possible use of free movement rights.
54. See, e.g., Corporación Dermoesthética SA v. To Me Group Advertising Media, Case
C-500/06 [2008] E.C.R. I-5785, 5826 (¶ 32), ECLI:EU:C:2008:421, and case-law cited there.
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had outgrown their roots in non-discrimination. In relation to the free
movement of goods nationality is in any event irrelevant.55
Returning to the examples that VerLoren van Themaat and the
present Author gave in relation to private action, the response of the
Court to attempts to thwart the exercise of free movement rights by
industrial action has been very significant. The clearest analogy for
evaluating collective action in the context of the free movement of
goods is the judgments in relation to the freedom of establishment and
the freedom to provide services respectively in Viking56 and in
Laval.57 These cases, which have generated a host of literature,58 most
of it extremely hostile, make it plain that collective action can
constitute an obstacle to the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty, and
that the extent and effects of such action will influence the
examination of the proportionality of the measure concerned. In
Viking, the measure was clearly wholly excessive, as it took no
account of situations in which equal or even better rights were being
offered on the reflagging of vessels. In Laval, the Court effectively
followed the line dictated by the EU’s Posted Workers Directive.59
55. The provisions of the TFEU on the free movement of goods benefits the goods,
irrespective of the nationality of the owner, consignor, consignee, or person in possession of
them. Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. SA Ch Brachfeld & Sons, Joined Cases 2 &
3/69 [1969] E.C.R. 211, 223 (¶ 24/26), ECLI:EU:C:1969:30.
56. International Transport Workers’ Federation et al. v. Viking Line ABP et al., Case C438/05 [2007] E.C.R. I-10779, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772.
57. Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C-341/05 [2007]
E.C.R. I-11767, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
58. See, e.g., VIKING, LAVAL AND BEYOND (M. Freedland & J. Prassl eds., 2014), with an
extensive bibliography; C. Joerges & F. Rödl, Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the
“Social Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in
Viking and Laval, 15 EURO. L. J. 1 (2009); L. Azoulai, The Court of Justice and the Social
Market Economy: the Emergence of an Ideal and the Conditions for its Realisation, 45
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1335 (2008); C. Barnard, British Jobs for British Workers: the
Lindsey Oil Refinery Dispute and the Future of Local Labour Clauses in an Integrated EU
Market, 28 IND. L. J. 245 (2009); N. Nic Shuibhne, Settling Dust? Reflections on the
Judgments in Viking and Laval, 21 EBLR 681 (2010). As to the follow-up to Viking and
Laval, see U. Bernitz & N. Reich’s case note on the decision of the Swedish Labour Court
(Arbetsdomstolen) No. 89/09 of 2 December 2009 in Laval, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 603
(2011). In Viking the case was settled and the ship was reflagged to Sweden, rather than to
Estonia; Laval (by then insolvent) was awarded damages for economic loss and exemplary
damages against the leading trade union involved (although the amounts awarded were
substantially lower than those claimed). See also M. Rönnmar, Sweden, in VIKING, LAVAL AND
BEYOND 241, 249–52 (M. Freedland & J. Prassl eds., Hart, 2014); M.Rönnmar, Laval Returns
to Sweden: The Final Judgment of the Swedish Labour Court 39 INDUS. L.J. 280 (2010); B.
van Leeuwen, An illusion of Protection and an assumption of responsibility: the possibility of
Swedish State liability after Laval, 14 CAMB. YELS 453 (2011–2012).
59. European Parliament and Council Directive 96/71 O.J. L 18/1 (1997).
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Weatherill refers to these judgments as “corruptions in EU internal
market law—corruptions of the Court’s otherwise rather good track
record in striking a balance between market deregulation and
protection of social, cultural and political values delivered by the
Member States.”60 The real complaint appears to be that the Court’s
evaluation of the proportionality of the industrial action was
unnuanced and insensitive to the justifications advanced, and that the
Court should have been more willing to grant the national regulator a
margin of discretion.61 With great respect, it should be recalled that
the Court has rightly refused to allow sectors of national law to be
protected from European scrutiny on the ground that they are special
or sensitive,62 and the Court was right not to call open season for
attempts to prevent people from taking advantage of the freedoms of
the internal market. It had already found that maintaining industrial
peace as a means of bringing a collective labour dispute to an end and
thereby preventing any adverse effects on an economic sector could
not constitute a reason relating to the general interest that justifies a
restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty.63 As is
well-known, economic justifications will not be accepted by the
Court.64 While, as will be discussed below, there has been a degree of
latitude in the face of peaceful, short-term protests, systematic use of
industrial action to torpedo the exercise of fundamental freedoms will
quickly be found to be excessive, particularly when protests are of a
violent and aggressive nature.
These cases relating to labour disputes almost always involve a
collective element, which is designed to have private market
regulatory effects (ensuring compliance with the collective
agreements). The collective element is also present in cases such as

60. S. Weatherill, Viking and Laval: The EU Internal Market Perspective, in VIKING,
LAVAL AND BEYOND, supra note 58.
61. Id. at 35–39.
62. E.g., Casati, Case 203/80 [1981] E.C.R. 2595, 2618 (¶ 27), ECLI:EU:C:1981:261;
Cowan v. Trésor public, Case 186/87 [1989] E.C.R. 195, 221–22 (¶19), ECLI:EU:C:1981:261;
The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan et al., Case C-159/90
[1991] E.C.R. I-4685 (¶ 18–21), ECLI:EU:C:1991:378.
63. See Syndesmos ton en Elladi Touristikon kai Taxidiotikon Grafeion (“SETTG”),
Case C-398/95 [1997] E.C.R. I-3091, 3121 (¶ 22–24), ECLI:EU:C:1997:282.
64. E.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 7/61 [1961] E.C.R. 317, 329, ECLI:EU:C:1961:31;
Commission v. Italy, Case 95/81 [1982] E.C.R. 2187, 2204 (¶ 27), ECLI:EU:C:1982:216;
SETTG, supra note 63, at 3121 (¶ 23).
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Walrave & Koch,65 although the regulatory function there is
essentially private in the judgments on sports bodies, as opposed to a
proper public law regulatory function through statutory powers.66 The
action of the individual employer in Angonese (requiring that the
language certificate issued exclusively by a regional authority at a
single examination centre in Bolzano) was a specific requirement in
the recruitment process: while a collective agreement authorised
employers to lay down conditions and rules for recruitment
competitions and selection criteria, the agreement did not itself
specify any language requirement; such lingusitic problems are very
much a regional issue in Alto Adige (South Tirol).67 Any collective
element in Angonese is, however, so extremely indirect and remote to
say the least, that the case should not be characterised as one with a
collective element. That judgment also dealt with the issue purely in
terms of non-discrimination, rather than in terms of the wider scope of
the fundamental freedoms. While Jarvis characterises it as a
controversial judgment,68 in reality it simply ensures that the rule of
non-disdrimination must be respected in all situations governed by
EU law;69 thus private employers cannot escape from compliance
with the demands of the European workplace. Any other result
whould have been wholly unconscionable. In Raccanelli the Court
confirmed its approach in Angonese.70 In Ferlini, the Court dealt with
an agreement between hospitals relating to fees, finding that the
general principle of non-discrimination of nationality, now set out in
Article 18 TFEU, also applied in cases where a group or organisation
exercised a certain power over individuals and was in a position to
impose on them conditions which adversely affect the exercise of the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Treaty.71 While the Court
65. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Bosman, Deliège, &
Lehtonen, supra note 53; Wouters et al. v. Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Case C-309/99,
[2002] E.C.R. I-1577, 1694 (¶ 120), ECLI:EU:C:2001:390.
66. See Royal Pharmaceutical Society, supra note 39.
67. See Angonese, supra, note 50, [2000] E.C.R. I-4139, 4167 (¶ 11).
68. M. Jarvis, in OLIVER ON FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION,
supra note 2, at 74. Although Jarvis suggests that the judgment is confined to the free
movement of workers, there is, with respect, no reason to deny its applicability in relation to
the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services.
69. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 62.
70. Raccanelli v. Max Planck Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft eV, Case C94/07 [2008] E.C.R. I-5939, 5954–56 (¶ 41–48), ECLI:EU:C:2008:425.
71. Ferlini v. Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg, Case C-411/98 [2000] E.C.R. I-8081,
8141, (¶ 50), ECLI:EU:C:2000:530.
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did not refer to the collective element, that was certainly present, as
the effect of the agreement on fees between the hospitals concerned.
As with the trade union cases, the aim was the enforcement of a
private collective agreement aimed at ‘regulating’ (or rather more
accurately, ‘fixing’) the market.
Some of the case-law in this field appears to support the view
that at least a collective element or aspect will be necessary to catch
private actors, save where specific rights are conferred on individuals
by EU regulations which are enforceable in both public and private
sectors. In some cases a regulatory function or aspect has also been
involved. Angonese and Raccanellii however, show that the Court is
willing to go further in respect of enabling persons to avail
themselves of the rights guaranteed by EU law.
IV. EFFECTS ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS
In view of the judgments in Viking and Laval in particular, issues
relating to the effects of industrial action on the free movement of
goods have assumed new relevance. If industrial action can infringe
the TFEU provisions on the right of establishment and the freedom to
provide (and receive) services, what logical reason is there not to find
that such action can hinder the free movement of goods? The
principle of private actors not being allowed to in effect resurrect or
create barriers to trade that the Member States have been required to
abolish is as surely applicable to barriers to trade in goods as it is to
barriers to trade in services.
The tendency in the free movement of goods field at European
level has so far been to face the Member State with its responsibility
for failure to take steps to ensure the free movement of goods, rather
than to attack the collective actors as such. In the case of industrial
action, the Member State concerned is under an obligation to take
appropriate measures to ensure the free movement of goods,72 and
failure to do so adequately or at all is likely to lead to infringement
proceedings, particularly where there has been widespread disruption
and lawlessness, as the Angry farmers judgment well demonstrates.73
However, in reconciling competing interests, the question is always
72. This obligation stems from the duty of loyal cooperation contained now in Article
4(3) TEU.
73. Commission v. France, Case C-265/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-6959 (‘Angry Framers’),
ECLI:EU:C:1997:595.
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where the balance should be struck. While obstruction of the
movement of goods clearly constitutes a hindrance to trade between
Member States, there may sometimes be an acceptable justification, if
the usual requirements of proportionality are observed. Thus
Schmidberger shows that not every instance of obstruction will give
rise to a right to a remedy in damages for an entity whose transport
operations have been disrupted.74 The Court recognized the
importance of freedom of speech in the context of localized
disruption, announced in advance as part of a legitimate right to
protest about environmental issues. It was significant in this case that
there were other routes available,75 so that there was not a wholesale
blockade, even if the Brenner route was the most important route.
Largely as a result of the Angry farmers judgment, but also
against the background of years of difficulties, particularly, but not
only, in France, European legislative action appeared in the form of
Regulation 2679/98.76 This regulation requires the Member States to
notify the Commission of any obstacle to the free movement of goods
attributable to a Member State, whether through action or inaction on
its part, which occurs or threatens to occur, which may infringe
Articles 34–36 TFEU and which physically or otherwise prevents,
delays or diverts trade importation into, exportation from, or transit
between Member States, and causes serious loss to the individuals
affected, and requires immediate action to prevent any continuation,
increase or intensification of the loss or disruption concerned. The
regulation does not, though, affect the exercise of fundamental rights
as recognized in the Member States, including the right or freedom to
strike or take other actions covered by the specific industrial relations
systems in Member States. Essentially, it is a notification and
consultation measure, the Commission cannot simply issue a decision

74. Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik
Österreich, Case C-112/00 [2003] E.C.R. I-5659, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333. As to attempts by the
Austrian authorities to restrict trans-alpine lorry transit, see Commission v. Austria, Case C320/03 [2005] E.C.R. I-9871, ECLI:EU:C:2005:684, noted by A. Schrauwen, 43 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1447 (2006), & Commission v. Austria, Case C-28/09 [2011] E.C.R. I-13525,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:854, noted by S. Enchelmaier, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 183 (2013).
75. This point is, though, at odds with other later judgments in which the Court regarded
the availability of other import routes as not negating the existence of a restriction of the free
movement of goods. See, e.g., Commission v. Austria, Case C-320/03, supra note 74 (¶ 67);
Commission v. Austria, Case C-28/09, supra note 74 (¶ 116).
76. O.J. L 337/8 (1998); see also the Resolution of the Member States meeting within
the Council of 7 December 1998, O.J. L 337/10 (1998).
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ordering the Member State to take action to break or lift industrial
action.
While it is clear that collective action can give rise to an obstacle
to the free movement of goods, the Commission’s approach would be
limited to taking action against the Member State under Article 259
TFEU for failure to ensure the free movement of goods, which may or
may not be linked to infringement of Article 4(3) TFEU and/or the
regulation in the case of non-cooperation. Private parties would be
left to seek damages in the national courts from the Member State
concerned, if the circumstances were serious enough (a sufficiently
serious breach), although that might well be difficult in practice.77
This indirect direct effect of Articles 34–36 is, it is submitted, too
uncertain in its outcome to be a realistic path to pursue in litigation
for all except those with the deepest pockets. The Commission would
not, of course, act against a trade union that had organized the action,
as there would be no procedure for bringing proceedings. Any private
individuals who sought to obtain redress in national courts for losses
they had suffered through the collective action could, depending on
the jurisdiction, be met with arguments invoking immunity from
tortious liability under national law. This, however, might fall foul of
the obligation on national courts to give effect to the freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty and to ensure that appropriate remedies are
available. If the private individuals, finding that they obtained nothing
from the trade union, then sought to obtain redress from the Member
State as compensation for the failure to maintain public order in
relation to ensuring free movement of goods, the field day for lawyers
would be evident. One thing seems certain, however, that any
prospect of individual strikers being sued would be wholly
undesirable on policy grounds and make no legal sense at all, just as
nobody suggests that an individual consumer who declines to buy
products from another Member State should face the prospect of civil
action by an importer or vendor of those products. Such an attitude,
while it may have an effect on the sales of imported products, is
simply too remote from any form of societal barrier through the
action of the State or those having collective or regulatory influence
on economic activities.

77. See K. Apps, Damages Claims Against Trade Unions After Viking And Laval, 34
EUR. L. REV. 141 (2009).
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Krenn,78 building on the analysis of Körber,79 has recently
stimulatingly argued in favour of the horizontal direct effect of Article
34 TFEU, arguing that private regulation (as opposed to State
regulation) is becoming more important and is encountered more
frequently, either in cooperation with the State or independently of it.
Thus the divide between public and private regulation is becoming
more blurred.80 On this basis, he sees the logic of the argument that
the open drafting of Articles 34–36 TFEU, the importance of the
contribution of the free movement of goods to the achievement of the
internal market, the threat to the unity of that market through
privately-errected barriers, lead inexcorably to the conclusion that
Articles 34–36 TFEU must be capable of horizontal direct effect.
They must be invokable by one private party against another.
The arguments against this based on interference with the role of
EU competiton law, are, he notes, essentially twofold: (i) conduct
which might not be caught because of the de minimis test in
competiton law might be caught under free movement of goods caselaw; (ii) given the existence of competiton law for attacking anticompetitve practices capable of hindering inter-State trade, why
would one need to have horizontal direct effect in the free movement
of goods applied cumulatively? He rightly notes, however, that such
arguments are not undisputed, and that while the Court has spoken of
the roles of the competition law provisions and the free movement of
goods provisions being discrete, examples can be found of their being
applied at the same time, just as the free movement of persons and
services was considered in Bosman, in which the Court also examined
the problem through the lens of competition law.81 Krenn also
observes that the Court has stated that private parties could rely on the
Treaty-based justifications for barriers to trade contained now in
Article 36 TFEU;82 presumably the same would apply to the caselaw-based justifications (although they are not available to
disciminatory measures, with the sole and perhaps understandable
exception of environmental protection measures). This conclusion by
the Court always seems, with respect, rather strange, as at least some
78. C. Krenn, A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect “Jigsaw”: Horizontal Direct
Effect and the Free Movement of Goods, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 177 (2012).
79. T. KÖRBER, GRUNDFREIHEITEN UND PRIVATRECHT 716 (2004).
80. See Krenn, supra note 78, at 201–02.
81. See id. at 205–06.
82. See id. at 206–07.

2015] PRIVATE PARTIES & FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 1011
of these public interest justifications are more appropriate in relation
to State action than to private action (public policy and public
security, for example).83 As has been suggested above, the indirect
route of seeking damages against the State for failure to prevent
disruption to the free movement of goods is not a sure defence and
weapon!
Krenn tries to square the circle by proposing a form of de
minimis test for the conduct of private individuals in the context of
Articles 34–36.84 But ultimately the Court is rightly still adamant that
de minimis has no place in Articles 30–36 TFEU. This applies just as
much to Article 34 TFEU85 as to the prohibition of charges having
equivalent effect to customs duties.86 As is well-known, Advocate
General Tesauro in Hünermund was unconvinced of the feasibility of
a de minimis test: it would be a ‘very difficult, if not downright
impossible exercise: quite apart from anything else, proving the
degree of hypothetical effects would be a probation diabolica.’87 The
contrary view was most famously put by Advocate General Jacobs in
Leclerc-Siplec.88 Mr. Jacobs (as he then was) pleaded for a de minimis
approach for equally-applicable measures as an alternative to the
widely discredited Keck approach to selling arrangements (he felt
though that de minimis would be inappropriate to deal with overtly
discriminatory measures). However, this rapidly falls foul of the thin
end of the wedge argument: where should the line be drawn? Several
83. In the same sense, K. Mortelmans in his annotation of Bosman, in SOCIAALECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 141–49 (1996).
84. See Krenn, supra note 78, at 209–12; see also M.S. Jansson & H. Kalimo, De
Minimis meets Market Access: Transformations in the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU
Free Movement Law?, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 523 (2014).
85. E.g., Prantl, Case 16/83 [1984] E.C.R. 1299, 1326, ¶ 20, ECLI:EU:C:1984:101; Van
der Haar et al., Joined Cases 177 & 178/82 [1984] E.C.R. 1797, ¶ 13, ECLI:EU:C:1984:144;
Commission v. France, Case 269/83 [1985] E.C.R. 837, ¶ 10, ECLI:EU:C:1985:115;
Commission v. Italy, Case 103/84 [1986] E.C.R. 1759, ¶ 18, ECLI:EU:C:1986:229;
Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co et al. v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C309/02 [2004] E.C.R. I-11763, ¶ 68, ECLI:EU:C:2004:799. See generally Corsica Ferries
France v. Direction générale des douanes françaises, Case C-49/89 [1989] E.C.R. 4441, ¶ 8,
ECLI:EU:C:1989:649.
86. E.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 24/68 [1969] E.C.R. 193, ¶ 9, ECLI:EU:C:1969:29;
Commission v. Greece, Case 229/87 [1988] E.C.R. 6347, ¶ 19, ECLI:EU:C:1988:501;
Carbonati Apuani Srl v. Comune di Carrara, Case C-72/03 [2004] E.C.R. I-8027, ¶ 20,
ECLI:EU:C:2004:506 .
87. Hünermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, Case C-292/92 [1993]
E.C.R. I-6787, ¶ 17 of his Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:1993:863.
88. Société d’importation Édouard Leclerc v. TFI Publicité SA et al., Case C-412/93
[1995] E.C.R. I-179, ¶¶ 42–49 of his Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:1994:393.
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criteria might come to mind: a percentage of GDP; a percentage of the
national market (and what would be the relevant market); the value of
a day’s imports, or the amount of the daily penalty for noncompliance with an ECJ judgment or failure to implement a directive
adequately or at all.89 Unlike in competition law, where a de minimis
threshold is well-known,90 in the free movement of goods cases it
would be wholly unworkable and arbitrary.
That said, the Court’s approach in the Use cases appears to have
given some encouragement to those who feel that a de minimis
approach in Article 34 TFEU would be a good idea. This comes from
the Court’s observation in Commission v. Italy that a prohibition on
the use of a product in the territory of a Member State has a
considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers, which, in its
turn, affects the access of that product to the market of that Member
State.’91 This is not, however, an introduction of a de minimis
threshold by the back door. In the reasoning of the Court this sentence
merely demonstrates that the effect is not hypothetical or so remote as
to be unrealistic. If there is an obstacle to the use of a product, in the
form of a prohibition or restriction, the (virtual) non-existence of a
market for it is scarcely surprising. In Mickelson & Roos (which was
decided at Chamber level, after the Grand Chamber’s judgment in
Commission v. Italy) the Court referred to the national regulations for
the designation of the navigable waters and waterways having “the
effect of preventing users of personal watercraft from using them for
the specific and inherent purposes for which they were intended or of
greatly restricting their use.” Enchelmaier regards this as accepting
that minor restrictions on use would fall outside the scope of Article
34 TFEU.92 He gives as probable examples: speed limits for cars; a
ban on commercial flights at night; a prohibition on using hand-held
89. See the European Commission’s Communication: Updating of Data Used to
Calculate Lump Sum and Penalty Payments to be Proposed by the Commission to the Court of
Justice in Infringement Proceeding, C (2014) 6767 final (Sept. 17, 2014).
90. See the Commission’s latest de minimis notice O.J. C 291/1 (2014) and the
Commission’s Staff Working Document (SWD 198 (2014)).
91. Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/95 [2009] E.C.R. I-2019, ¶ 56.
92. S. Enchelmaier, supra note 5, at 191–92. He sees restrictions on use being caught if
(i) they constitute total bans on use; or (ii) they prevent goods being employed for the ‘specific
and inherent purposes for which they were intended, or (iii) they ‘greatly restrict their use.’
See making a similar analysis with some similar and some other examples, N. de Sadeleer,
‘L’examen au régard de l’article 28 CE, des règles régissant l’utilisation de certains
produits’, JDE 247, 248 (2009) and 2 EJCL 231, 240 (2012). Enchelmaier regards these last
two criteria as not being notable for their precision.
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mobile phones while driving a motor vehicle; bans on minors being
served alcohol in restaurants or using ultra-violet sun-beds, and a ban
on the use of mobile phones in hospitals. But he rightly acknowledges
that such examples would be regarded as having a too uncertain or
indirect effect to be regarded as hindering trade between Member
States. Even if, which is unlikely, they were not to be so regarded, it
is submitted that various justifications (such as road safety,
environmental/health protection and avoiding threats to the integrity
of hospital equipment) would be easily available to ensure that such
measures would not be regarded as prohibited.
While there have indeed been a handful of cases in which the
Court has regarded the measure concerned as being too remote or the
effect too uncertain or indirect93—a way of saying that the
integrationist merit was very thin indeed—these are very rare
93. Peralta, Case C-379/92 [1994] E.C.R. I-3453, ¶ 24, ECLI:EU:C:1994:296 (citing
Krantz v. Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen, Case C-69/88 [1990] E.C.R. I-583, ¶ 11,
ECLI:EU:C:1990:97; CMC Motorradcenter v. Pelin Baskiciogullari, Case C-93/92 [1993]
E.C.R. I-5009, ¶ 12, ECLI:EU:C:1993:838). In Peralta, the Court noted that the measure was
equally applicable and was not designed to regulate trade in goods between Member States.
The first of these points is not a matter which would per se take a measure outside the
definition of measures having equivalent effect (as is shown by e.g. Cassis de Dijon (ReweZentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, Case 120/78 [1979] E.C.R. 649,
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42), and the second point is, as has been demonstrated above, manifestly
irrelevant to the analysis. The final point, that the restrictive effects the measure might have on
the free movement of goods were too uncertain or indirect, has rather more weight. See Centro
Servizi Spediporto, Case C-96/94 [1995] E.C.R. I-2883, ¶ 41, ECLI:EU:C:1995:308; DIP SpA
et al. v. Commune di Bassano del Grappa et al., Joined Cases C-140–142/94 [1995] E.C.R. I3257, ¶ 29, ECLI:EU:C:1995:330; Corsica Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori
del Porto di Genova Coop. Arl et al., Case C-266/96 [1998] E.C.R. I-3949, ¶ 31,
ECLI:EU:C:1998:306. Another example of this can be seen in Blesgen v. Belgium, Case 75/81
[1982] E.C.R. 1211, ¶ 9–10, ECLI:EU:C:1982:117, in which, having expressly noted that even
if a measure did not directly affect imports, it might, according to the circumstances, affect
prospects for importing products from other Member States, the Court concluded that the
restrictions on the sale of strong spirits in places open to the public made no distinction
whatsoever based on the nature or origin of the products; the measure, the Court stated, had in
fact no connection with importation of the products and for that reason was not of such a
nature as to impede trade between Member States. In relation to exports, in ED Srl v. Italo
Fenocchio, Case C-412/97 [1999] E.C.R. I-3845, ¶ 11, ECLI:EU:C:1999:324, the Court found
that different treatment of creditors under Article 633 of the Italian Civil Code according to
whether the debtor was resident in or outside Italy was too uncertain or indirect for the
provision to be regarded as liable to hinder trade between Member States. But in that case, it
could equally well be argued that under the criterion in P.B. Groenveld BV v. Produktschap
voor Vee en Vlees, Case 15/79 [1979] E.C.R. 3409, ¶ 7, ECLI:EU:C:1979:253, there was no
particular advantage for national production or for the domestic Italian market. While the
Court cited that criterion (albeit referring to a later judgment), it was, with respect, misguided
to do so, because the Groenveld criterion was evolved in the context of measures applicable
irrespective of the destination of the products, not for different treatment.
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occurrences indeed. These judgments are usually cited as examples of
a remoteness test: they are not examples of a de minimis test.94
Remoteness is not a form of de minimis. In its celebrated judgment in
Bluhme,95 which dealt with a prohibition on importing onto the island
of Lesø bees other than the Lesø brown bee, the Court rejected a
remoteness argument. This case, like others, demonstrates that even if
the measure covers only a small part of national territory, it can still
fall foul of Article 34 TFEU.96 Thus there is no de minimis approach
in relation to the internal market, either in the economic extent of the
measure or in its territorial scope, or in any other aspect. Krenn’s
proposal for a de minimis threshold in relation to conduct by
individuals, understandably in view of the structure of his argument,
chooses the effect on the internal market rather than the mere effect
on the individual’s right derived from Articles 30—36,97 but
utimately his threshold would offer little solace to an individual
litigant, even if a national judge were to agree to refer each claim to
the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU for a preliminary ruling.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the better solution is to regard actions by individuals as
being too remote from the realities of intra-Union trade, but action
that takes a collective form of pressure, or incitation, or action against
foreign goods as being caught, just as an act by a private market
regulator is caught. Thus regard would be had to the circumstances in
the round, rather than to pure theoretical dogma. This approach would
avoid the slippery slope of de minimis. In line with the Court of
Justice’s steadfast refusal to accept purely economic justifications for
94. In Corsa Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del Porto di Genova
Coop. Arl, Case C-266/96 [1998] E.C.R. I-3949, 3392 (¶ 30), the Court noted that the effects
of the mooring services charge concerned persons as well as goods, but if only goods were
involved the costs of the mooring services were very small indeed as an additional cost for
transported products (approximately 0.05%). But here too, (at ¶ 31) the Court actually adopted
a Peralta approach (effects too uncertain and indirect),The charge was for the mooring
services offered by exclusive concessionnaires.
95. Bluhme, Case C-67/97 [1998] E.C.R. I-8033, 8063 ( ¶ 22) ECLI:EU:C:1998:584.
96. See Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA et al. v. Departamento de Sanidad y
Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Cataluña, Joined Cases C-1/90 & 176/90 [1991] E.C.R.
I-4151, 4186 (¶ 24) ECLI:EU:C:1991:327; Ligur Carni Srl et al. v. Unità Sanitaria Locale No
XV di Genova et al., Joined Cases C-277/91, C-318/91 & C-319/91 [1993] E.C.R. I-6621,
6661 (¶ 37) ECLI:EU:C:1993:927; see Carbonati Apuani Srl v. Comune di Carrara, Case C72/03 [2004] E.C.R. I-8027, 8060 (¶ 20) ECLI:EU:C:2004:506.
97. See Krenn, supra note 78, at 211.
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barriers to trade,98 economic arguments would not be available. It is
difficult to see how justifications other than those expressly
recognized in the TFEU could be advanced, as a boycott in particular
is inherently discriminatory. While the freedom of expression of
individuals is recognised in EU law as a ground of justification, it can
be argued that it is now essentially a Treaty-based right (given the
importance of fundamental rights in the post-Lisbon Treaties), as
opposed to being (as initially) a case-law-based right, so that it would
remain available to discriminatory action, even though the case-lawbased justifications are not available in such cases. Fundamental
rights do indeed have a special status in EU law, but (as Viking and
Laval show in the context of establishment and services) that does not
mean that the freedom of expression will always trump free
movement rights, as the freedom of expression is a relative right, not
an absolute right,99 no matter how much the purveyors of alleged
social interests find the consequences of a single internal market
difficult to accept. Accordingly, a pragmatic approach may be more
appropriate than a wholly theoretical one! It is submitted that private
individuals should always have the right to their views and to express
them, but that collective action should certainly be open to being
tested before national courts. If a justification known to EU law can,
in all the circumstances, be prayed in aid, if the action is
proportionate, then the appropriate conclusion can be drawn. But a
dogmatic standpoint is frankly not what the Court is there to deliver:
it is there to solve concrete problems, and from those solutions
principles can be distilled. The Court tries to be consistent and
coherent, and does not always come anywhere near succeeding, but it
is essentially a pragmatic body. Its solutions, and where it draws the
line, may not always be convincing, but doctrine for the sake of
98. E.g., Commission v. Italy, Case 7/61 [1961] E.C.R. 317, 329, ECLI:EU:C:1961:31;
Commission v. Italy, Case 95/81 [1982] E.C.R. 2187, 2204 (¶ 27) ECLI:EU:C:1982:216;
Duphar BV v. Netherlands, Case 238/82 [1984] E.C.R. 523, 542 (¶ 23) ECLI:EU:C:1984:45;
Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Industry and Energy, Case 72/83 [1984] E.C.R. 2727, 2752 (¶
35) ECLI:EU:C:1984:256, in which the Court accepted (¶ 36) that in the light of the
seriousness of the consequences of an interruption in supplies of petroleum products could
have for a country’s existence, the aim of ensuring a minimum supply of such products at all
times was to be regarded as transcending purely economic considerations and thus as capable
of falling within the concept of public security); Commission v. Ireland, Case 288/83 [1985]
E.C.R. 1761, 1776 (¶ 28) ECLI:EU:C:1985:251; Commission v. France, Case C-265/95 [1997]
E.C.R. I-6959, 7004 (¶ 62); Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris NV et al.,
Case C-322/01 [2003] E.C.R. I-14887, 15001 (¶ 122) ECLI:EU:C:2003:664.
99. See, e.g., Schmidberger, supra note 74, ¶¶ 79–80.
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doctrine does not always offer a sensible outcome which would
command consensus among litigants, or even among the general
public. The analysis offered here may, it is to be hoped, provide a
prod towards continued pragmatism.
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